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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
William Jack Bias appeals from the judgment entered upon his guilty plea
to felony DUI.

On appeal, Bias argues the district court erred by denying his

motion for the appointment of counsel to pursue his post-judgment motions to
withdraw his guilty plea and for a reduction of sentence.

He also argues the

court abused its sentencing discretion.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In September 2012, an officer observed Bias' vehicle "drifting in its lane,
driving on top of the white fog line, traveling under the speed limit, and then
braking hard when approaching a curve in the road." (PSI, p.3.) When stopped
by the officer, Bias stated "he did not have a driver's license, was 'not sure' about
his registration and insurance, and didn't know his address." (PSI, p.3.) The
officer smelled the odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle and "observed a
partially empty bottle of Jack Daniels Whiskey and a six pack of mostly
consumed Smirnoff mixed alcohol bottles in the back seat." (PSI, p.3.) Bias'17year-old son was in the vehicle and "admitted to having taken a 'bug gulp,' of his
Dad's whiskey and coke, from the bottle located on the console between the
front seats." (PSI, pp.3-4.) Bias claimed ownership of the alcohol and admitted
he had been drinking. (PSI, p.3.) His eyes were "red, glassy and watery" and
his speech was "slow and lethargic." (PSI, p.3.) He failed field sobriety tests and
subsequent evidentiary testing showed he had a BAC of .107/.106. (PSI, p.4.)

1

The state charged Bias with felony DUI (three or more DUI convictions in
10 years) and misdemeanor injury to child. (R., pp.36-38.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Bias pled guilty to felony DUI and the state dismissed the remaining
charge. (R., pp.45-46.) The district court accepted Bias' plea and imposed a
unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed. (R., pp.50-52.) Bias timely
appealed. (R., pp.55-57.) He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of
his sentence. (R., pp.53-54.)
Before the district court ruled on his Rule 35 motion, Bias filed a pro se
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Augmentation: "Motion To Withdraw Guilty
Plea And Supporting Information" (hereinafter "Motion To Withdraw Plea"), filed
June 4, 2013.) As the basis for his motion, Bias asserted he had entered his
plea on the advice of counsel and under a good faith belief that counsel had
provided him with adequate information concerning his defenses.
Withdraw Plea.)

(Motion to

Bias further asserted that, "[u]pon further investigation[]," he

discovered counsel was aware of, but "neglected to pursue possible defenses
previous to [his] plea of Guilty" and, according to Bias, "said defenses would
have provided a substantially different outcome."

(Motion to Withdraw Plea.)

Bias also filed a pro se motion for the appointment of counsel to pursue the
motion for withdrawal of his plea, asserting therein that the failure of his
previously appointed counsel to "adequately argue defenses for [his] benefit
[had] caused the Attorney/Client relationship to become irreparably damaged."
(Augmentation:

"Motion

For

Appointment

Of

Counsel

And

Information" (hereinafter "Motion for Counsel"), filed June 4, 2013.)
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Supporting

At a hearing on June 24, 2013, the district court took up Bias' Rule 35
motion and his pro se motions for the appointment of counsel and withdrawal of
his guilty plea. (See generally 6/24/13 Tr.) Bias was not present at the hearing,
but his previously appointed trial counsel argued the Rule 35 motion on Bias'
behalf. (6/24/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.7-13, p.17, Ls.8-22.) Counsel did not argue the
merits of Bias' pro se motions but advised the court that he (counsel) had
essentially construed those motions as a petition for post-conviction relief. (Tr.,
p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.7.) The district court agreed with counsel's characterization
of Bias' pro se motions as reading like a post-conviction petition and, ultimately,
denied them, reasoning:
The Defendant is asking for the Court to appoint new
counsel for him while his case is under appeal, under the
circumstances I don't think the Court should appoint new counsel
at this time. In essence, he's trying to get new counsel to handle
Rule 35 - excuse me, post-conviction relief. Post-conviction relief
has a process for the appointment of counsel and if postured
correctly the Court certainly would consider that request. ...
But, again, I am going to deny the Motions as filed, but I'm
going to deny them without prejudice and certainly the Defendant
can pursue these issues on post-conviction if he wishes to file a
Petition that complies with the law ....
But at this time the Court finds that there's no manifest
injustice alleged except for ineffective assistance of counsel issues.
Certainly the Defendant isn't arguing that he was innocent. If he
was, then the Court would take a very different look at this, but the
Defendant is basically arguing that he disagreed with Defense
Counsel's handling of the case and that typically is a postconviction relief matter.
(6/24/13 Tr., p.21, L.6 - p.22, L.8; see also Augmentation: "Order Denying All

Pending Motions" (hereinafter "Order Denying Motions), filed June 24, 2013.)
The court also denied Bias' Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, finding in
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light of Bias' extensive criminal record and history of driving under the influence
that "the original sentence imposed in this matter was appropriate." (6/24/13 Tr.,
p.19, L.7 - p.20, L.21; see also Order.)
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ISSUES
Bias states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bias' motion for
the appointment of new counsel to represent him in regard
to his Rule 35 motion and his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a
unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, upon Mr.
Bias following his plea of guilty to a felony DUI?

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Bias failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for the appointment of counsel to pursue his postjudgment motions?

2.

Has Bias failed to show the district court abused its discretion by imposing
a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, upon Bias' guilty plea
to felony DUI?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Bias Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion For The
Appointment Of Substitute Counsel To Pursue His Post-Judgment Motions

A.

Introduction
Bias argues the district court erred in denying his motion for the

appointment of substitute counsel to pursue his post-judgment motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. 1

Specifically, Bias contends, "based on both his

constitutional right to counsel and his statutory right to counsel," that (1) the
district court was required to appoint counsel to represent him on his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because an actual conflict of interest existed between
Bias and his previously appointed attorney, and (2) the court erred by failing to
conduct an adequate inquiry into the basis for Bias' request for counsel.
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.)

Bias' arguments fail for several reasons.

First,

because Bias does not challenge the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, his claim on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by declining
to appoint substitute counsel to pursue that motion is necessarily moot. Second,
even if the issue is not moot, Bias had no constitutional right to the appointment

Bias also contends the court should have appointed substitute counsel to
represent him on his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (Appellant's
brief, pp.5-12.) Although the district court indicated it would allow Bias to reopen
his Rule 35 motion if the court granted his motion for the appointment of counsel
(6/24/13 Tr., p.19, Ls.7-17), it does not appear that Bias ever requested
substitute counsel in relation to the Rule 35 motion (compare Motion for Counsel
and Motion to Withdraw plea, filed pro se on June 4, 2013, with R., pp.53-45
(Rule 35 Motion, filed by counsel on April 16, 2013)). Having never asked the
district court to appoint counsel to pursue his Rule 35 motion, Bias' claim that the
district court erred by not doing so is not properly before this Court on appeal.
1
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of counsel to pursue his post-judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, as
such, the district court had no duty to appoint substitute counsel based on any
alleged conflict or to inquire of Bias personally regarding the basis for his motion.
Third, contrary to Bias' assertions, the statutory "right" to counsel in postjudgment proceedings is not coextensive with the constitutional right to counsel
and, therefore, the court was not required to follow the procedures required
under the Sixth Amendment to rule on Bias' request for substitute counsel;
instead, the court's decision whether to appoint substitute counsel in relation to
Bias' post-jUdgment motion was purely discretionary. Finally, correct application
of the law shows the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bias'
motion for the appointment of new counsel in the post-judgment phase of the
criminal case to pursue what was effectively an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
"[T]he decision of whether to appoint substitute counsel lies within the

discretion of the trial court and will only be reviewed for an abuse of discretion."
State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, _ , 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 2012) (citation
omitted); see also I.C. § 19-856 (trial court may, for good cause, appoint
substitute counsel).

C.

Bias' Challenge To The Denial Of His Motion For The Appointment Of
Substitute Counsel Is Moot
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial

controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief."
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State v.

Barclay, 149 Idaho 6,8,232 P.3d 327,329 (2010) (citations omitted). "A case is
moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will
have no practical effect upon the outcome." In re Doe I, 145 Idaho 337, 340,
179 P.3d 300, 303 (2008) (quoting Goodson v. Nez Perce Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993 P.2d 614, 616 (2000». The mootness
doctrine precludes review when "the issues presented are no longer live or the
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Idaho Schools for
Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281, 912 P.2d
644, 649 (1996) (quoting Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429,432,816 P.2d 986,
989 (1991».
Bias argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for the appointment of counsel to pursue his post-judgment motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.

(Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.)

The district court, however,

determined that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims contained in the
motion for withdrawal of the plea would be more appropriately addressed in a
separate post-conviction action and so denied the motion without prejudice to
allow Bias to pursue those claims, and seek the assistance of counsel, pursuant
to the provisions of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. (Order Denying
Motions; 6/24/13 Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.22, L.8.)

On appeal, Bias does not

challenge the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (See Appellant's
brief, p.3 n.2.) Because the court's determination that the merits of the motion
for withdrawal of the plea are better suited for a post-conviction action is
unchallenged, Bias' claim on appeal that the court should have appointed
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substitute counsel to pursue the motion to withdraw the plea is necessarily moot
because there is no longer any such motion to pursue.

A remand for the

appointment of counsel to pursue a motion Bias apparently concedes should be
litigated in a different forum will have no practical effect upon the outcome of the
case. The issue is therefore moot and this Court should decline to consider it.

D.

Bias Had No Sixth Amendment Right To Be Represented By Counsel On
His Post-Judgment Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to

counsel during all "critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him.
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006) (citing United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637
P.2d 415 (1981)).

Although this right encompasses the first direct appeal, it

does not extend to post-conviction proceedings. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S.
327, 336-37 (2007); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). See also
Murphy v. State, _

P.3d _ , 2014 WL 712695, *5 (Idaho 2014) (pet. for reh'g

pending) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)) ("'[T]here is
no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings."'). Like
other post-conviction proceedings, a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty
plea is not a "critical stage" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and, as such, a
defendant has no constitutional right to an attorney to pursue such a motion.
State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454, 235 P.3d 404 (Ct. App. 2010). Because Bias
had no constitutional right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, his claim on appeal that the district court had a duty
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under the Sixth Amendment to inquire regarding the basis of Bias' request for
substitute counsel andlor to appoint substitute counsel (see Appellant's brief,
pp.5-12) necessarily fails.

E.

The Trial Court's Decision Whether To Appoint Substitute Counsel
Pursuant To I.C. § 19-856 Was Discretionary And Not Subject To The
Procedures Necessary To Safeguard The Constitutional Right To ConflictFree Counsel In The Critical Stages Of A Criminal Case
Idaho Code § 19-852 confers upon indigent defendants the right to be

represented by counsel at all stages of criminal proceedings, including all nonfrivolous post-conviction proceedings.

Consistent with his statutory right, Bias

was represented by the county public defender throughout the criminal
proceedings, including the pursuit of his Rule 35 motion. (See R., pp.23, 27, 33,
39-42, 45-46, 48-49, 53-54; 2/11/13 Tr.; 3/18/13 Tr.; 6/24/13 Tr.) After he was
sentenced, Bias moved for the appointment of new counsel to pursue a postjudgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that his previously
appointed attorney "failed to adequately argue defenses for [his] benefit," thus
"caus[ing] the AttorneylClient relationship to become irreparably damaged."
(Motion for Counsel, ~4.) The district court denied the motion, reasoning that
Bias' request to withdraw his guilty plea - a request based on allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel - would be more appropriately addressed in a
separate action for post-conviction relief.

(6/24113 Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.22, L.8;

Order Denying Motions.)
Citing the standards applicable to the right to conflict-free counsel
conferred by the Sixth Amendment and I.C. § 19-852, Bias argues on appeal
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that the district court, having become aware of an "actual conflict of interest"
between trial counsel and Bias, was required to appoint substitute counsel to
assist Bias in pursuing his post-judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea and
was also required to inquire of Bias personally regarding the basis of his request.
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) Bias' arguments fail on their premise. The district
court's decision whether to appoint substitute counsel to pursue a post-judgment
motion was not governed by the procedures required by the Sixth Amendment to
safeguard the right to conflict-free counsel in the critical stages of a criminal
case.

Two cases, Murphy v. State, _

P.3d _ , 2014 WL 712695 (Idaho

2014) (pet. for reh'g pending), and Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 160 P.3d
1275 (Ct. App. 2007), are particularly instructive on this point.
In Murphy, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed in what circumstances a
statutory "right" to counsel also carries with it the guarantees of effective
assistance of counsel and conflict-free counsel. Murphy, _
WL 712695, *6.

P.3d at _ , 2014

The Court distinguished between statutes that mandate the

appointment of post-conviction counsel versus those that leave the decision to
appoint counsel within the district court's discretion.

19.:.

Citing Idaho Criminal

Rule 44.2, which "provides for the mandatory appointment of counsel for postconviction review after the imposition of the death penalty," the Court noted its
recent holding in Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, _ , 315 P.3d 798, 804 (2013),
"that post-conviction petitioners sentenced to death have the right to conflict-free
counseL"

Murphy, _

P.3d at _ , 2014 WL 712695, *6.

The Court then

contrasted Rule 44.2 with I.C. § 19-4904, which leaves the decision to appoint
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post-conviction counsel in a non-capital case within the discretion of the district

1st

court.

Because the appointment of counsel under I. C. § 19-4904 is

discretionary, the Murphy Court observed that that statute does not even "create
a statutory right to post-conviction counsel," id. (citing Fields v. State, 135 Idaho
286,291, 17 P.3d 230, 235 (2000)), much less a right to the effective assistance
of counsel in non-capital post-conviction proceedings. See

1st ("Where there

is

no right to counsel, there can be no deprivation of the effective assistance of
counsel.").

Thus, the Court effectively held that only statutes making the

appointment of counsel mandatory confer upon indigent litigants the right,
normally associated with the Sixth Amendment, to the effective assistance of
counsel.
Recognizing that a post-conviction petitioner has no constitutional or
statutory right to counsel, the Idaho Court of Appeals held in Rios-Lopez v. State,
144 Idaho 340, 160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007), that the procedures required to
rule on a request for substitute counsel made by a criminal defendant with a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel do not apply in post-conviction proceedings.
The Court reasoned:
[W]e are not persuaded by Rios-Lopez's reliance on cases
addressing the procedures necessary to rule on a criminal
defendant's request to substitute counsel in criminal proceedings.
See State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715, 52 P.3d 857, 860 (2002);
State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898, 606 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1980);
State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713, 946 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Ct. App.
1997). Both a criminal defendant and an applicant for postconviction relief may be appointed a substitute counsel if good
cause is shown for such substitution. See I.C. § 19-856. However,
determining whether good cause exists to substitute counsel for a
criminal defendant differs from determining whether good cause
exists to substitute cou nsel for an applicant for post-conviction
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relief because the underlying rights to counsel differ. A criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to counsel; but, in Idaho, an
applicant for post-conviction relief does not even have a statutory
right to counsel. See Follinus, 127 Idaho at 902 & n. 1, 908 P.2d at
595 & n. 1. See also I.C. § 19-4904. Indeed, a claim of ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel may not be brought because
the applicant for post-conviction relief does not have a right to
effective assistance of counsel. See Follinus, 127 Idaho at 902-03,
908 P.2d at 595-96. Because Nath, Clayton, and Peck address the
procedures necessary to protect a criminal defendant's
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal
proceedings, those cases are inapposite.
Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343-44, 160 P.3d at 1278-79. Cases addressing "the
procedures necessary to protect a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings" are likewise "inapposite"
in this case because, as already discussed above, Bias had no constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel to pursue his post-judgment motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.
Bias' request for substitute counsel was governed by I.C. § 19-856, which
provides provides that, "[a]t any stage, including appeal or other post-conviction
proceeding, the court concerned may for good cause assign a substitute
attorney." (Emphasis added). Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, the
decision whether to appoint substitute counsel is discretionary. Accord State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 702, 215 P.3d 414, 422 (2009); State v. Lippert, 152
Idaho 884, _,276 P.3d 756,759 (Ct. App. 2012). Because the statute makes
substitution of counsel discretionary, and because Bias had no constitutional
right to be represented by counsel to pursue his post-judgment motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, the procedures mandated by the Sixth Amendment to
guarantee effective assistance - such as the duty to inquire into conflicts of

13

interest - did not apply. Murphy, _

P.3d. at _ , 2014 WL712695, *6; Rios-

Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343-44, 160 P.3d at 1278-79.

Bias' assertions to the

contrary are without merit.

F.

The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Denying Bias' Motion
For The Appointment Of Substitute Counsel To Pursue In Post-Judgment
Proceedings What Was Effectively An Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Claim
"'A trial court may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant

upon a showing of good cause.'" State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 297 P.3d 244
(2013) (quoting State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 702, 215 P.3d 414, 422
(2009)); see also State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, _ , 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct.
App. 2012); I.C. § 19-856. "Whether substitute counsel should be provided is a
decision that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be
reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion." Severson, 147 Idaho at 702,
215 P.3d at 422 (citing State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715, 52 P.3d 857, 860
(2002)).

"The trial court's decision will only be regarded as an abuse of

discretion if it violated the defendant's right to counsel."

kl

(citing Nath, 137

Idaho at 715, 52 P.3d at 860).
Bias argues the district court was required to appoint substitute counsel to
represent him on post-judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims he alleged in that motion "created an
actual conflict of interest as trial counsel had a personal interest in seeing those
claims denied."

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.)

There is no question that, in

circumstances where an indigent defendant has a right to counsel, an actual
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conflict of interest constitutes "good cause" mandating the appointment of

li,

substitute counsel.

Lippert, 152 Idaho at _ , 276 P.3d at 759.

As

discussed above, however, Bias had no constitutional right to counsel to pursue
his post-judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea, State v. Hartshorn, 149
Idaho 454, 235 P.3d 404 (Ct. App. 2010), and any statutory entitlement to
counsel depended on the viability of the motion, see I.C. § 19-852(b)(3) (no
entitlement to counsel to pursue frivolous post-conviction or post-commitment
proceedings).
The district court, in its discretion, determined that Bias' motion to
withdraw his guilty plea failed to satisfy the "manifest injustice" standard of I.C.R.
33, and that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims alleged therein would be
"more

appropriately

determined

under

Idaho's

Uniform

Post-Conviction

Procedure Act." (Order Denying All Pending Motions; see also 6/24/13 Tr., p.20,
L.22 - p.22, L.8.) In making this determination, which Bias does not challenge
on appeal, the district court effectively ruled that Bias' post-judgment motion was
not one a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at
his own expense in the criminal proceeding. Because the motion was frivolous,
Bias was not statutorily entitled to counsel, much less substitute counsel, to
pursue the motion. I.C. §§ 19-852, 19-856.
Even assuming Bias had a statutory right to counsel to pursue his postjudgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he has failed to show the existence
of any "actual conflict of interest" that would have mandated the appointment of
substitute counsel.

Trial counsel did not argue the merits of Bias' motion for
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withdrawal of his guilty plea (see 6/24/13 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.22), and the
district court denied the motion without prejudice on the basis that the issues
presented therein would be more appropriately addressed in a separate postconviction action (see Order Denying Motions; 6/24/13 Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.22,
L.8).

In so ruling, the district court actually avoided any potential conflict that

would have arisen had trial counsel been required to argue the merits of the
motion and litigate his own alleged ineffectiveness.

Because Bias does not

challenge the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea - and, more
particularly, the court's determination that the claims therein would be better
disposed of in a separate post-conviction action - he has failed to show any
abuse of discretion in the denial of his motion for substitute counsel to pursue
that motion.

II.
Bias Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion

A.

Introduction

°

Bias challenges the unified sentence of 1 years, with five years fixed,
imposed upon his guilty plea to felony DUI, contending the sentence is excessive
in light of the mitigating factors he claims are present in this case. (Appellant's
brief, pp.12-14.) A review of the record and of the applicable law supports the
sentence imposed. Bias has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
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397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
sentencing court abused its discretion.

C.

!s:L.

Bias Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any
Reasonable View Of The Facts
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577,
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

!s:L.

Thirty-five-year-old Bias has over a 20-year history of violating the law.
(PSI, pp.1-2, 4-13.)

By his own account, "he was arrested for the first time

around age 13, for underage consumption of alcohol." (PSI, p.12.) Between his
thirteenth and eighteenth birthdays, he was adjudicated for a string of juvenile
offenses, ultimately resulting in a two-and-one-half-year period of incarceration in
a juvenile detention facility.

(PSI, ppA-7, 12.) He committed his first felony,

possession of methamphetamine, when he was just 18 years old. (PSI, pp.8,
12.) Within three days of being placed on probation for that offense, Bias was
charged with his second felony, driving without privileges, and was sentenced to
a "Rider."

(PSI, pp.9, 12.) Just two months after being placed on probation

following his rider, Bias drove while intoxicated and caused an accident that
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resulted in the death of his passenger. (PSI, pp.9, 12.) He was convicted of
vehicular manslaughter and served 10 years in prison, during which time he was
a disciplinary problem. (PSI, pp.9, 12-13.) After being released from prison in
May 2008, Bias committed multiple misdemeanor driving and alcohol-related
offenses, including at least three misdemeanor DUl's. (PSI, pp.10-13.) In fact,
he was on probation for a 2012 misdemeanor DUI when committed the felony
DUI to which he pled guilty in this case. (PSI, p.13.)
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court "very carefully"
reviewed the presentence materials, including the substance abuse and mental
health evaluations that indicate Bias suffers from alcohol dependence and
depressive disorder for which he is in need of treatment. (3/18/13 Tr., p.18, L.6
- p.19, L.20.)

The court considered Bias' "remarkable" record of juvenile

adjudications and adult convictions and noted the only significant period of time
Bias abstained from breaking the law was during his 10-year period of
incarceration, "although [he was] breaking the rules of prison."

(3/18/13 Tr.,

p.19, L.20 - p.21, L.2.) The court articulated its consideration of the objectives
of sentencing, observing with respect to the primary objective of protecting
society that "it's hard to understate [sic] the importance of that element of
sentencing because [Bias has] a history of not only drinking and driving, but ... of
killing people when [he does] so." (3/18/13 Tr., p.21, Ls.12-23.) In light of Bias'
history, the court found it particularly aggravating that Bias had his 17-year-old
son in the car with him when he committed the DUI in this case. (3/18/13 Tr.,
p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.17.) The court also considered deterrence and rehabilitation

18

but found it hard to gauge those objectives in light of the fact that Bias had been
neither deterred nor rehabilitated by prior legal sanctions and treatment
opportunities.

(3/18/13 Tr., p.22, L.18 - p.23, L.18.)

Finally, the court

considered the need for punishment in the form of a prison sentence, which the
court deemed "a very realistic outcome" given Bias' prior record. (3/18/13 Tr.,
p.24, Ls.3-20.) Taking into account all the objectives of sentencing, and carefully
considering the criteria of I. C. § 19-2521, the court concluded that a 10-year
sentence, with the first five years fixed, was not only warranted, but necessary, to
protect the community from Bias' unyielding propensity to drink and drive.
(3/18/13 Tr., p.24, L.21 - p.33, L.2.)

On appeal, Bias does not contest any of the information upon which the
district court relied in crafting his underlying sentence. Instead, he claims only
that the court should have given greater weight to factors he deems mitigating,
including his "difficult childhood," his "history of mental health issues," the fact
that he provided financial support for three of his four children, and his assertion
that his actions in this case were induced by grief over his brother's death.
(Appellant's brief, pp.12-14.) There can be no question that the district court was
aware of these "mitigating factors" when it imposed Bias' sentence. In fact, the
court specifically articulated its consideration of all of these factors in crafting
Bias'sentence. (See 3/18/13 Tr., p.18, L.18 - p.19, L.18, p.23, L.19 - p.24, L.2,
p.25, L.4 - p.26, L.8.) That the court did not assign these factors greater weight
or elevate them above the need to protect society while at the same time
providing Bias an opportunity for structured rehabilitation does not show the
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sentence is excessive. Bias' sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed is more
than reasonable given the nature of his crime and his demonstrated failures to
be rehabilitated or deterred despite prior treatment opportunities and legal
sanctions. Bias has failed to show an abuse of sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and
sentence and the district court's order denying Bias' post-judgment motion for
the appointment of counsel.
DATED this 3rd day of April, 2014.
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